Factor Endowment, the Choice of Technology, and the Volume of Trade by Zhou, Haiwen
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Factor Endowment, the Choice of
Technology, and the Volume of Trade
Haiwen Zhou
2007
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76424/
MPRA Paper No. 76424, posted 27 January 2017 08:42 UTC
Factor Endowment, the Choice of Technology, and the Volume 
of Trade 
 
Haiwen Zhou1 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies impacts of factor endowment on international trade in a general 
equilibrium model in which firms choose their technologies endogenously. Though 
countries only differ in factor endowment ex ante, countries may also differ in their chosen 
technologies.  If industries choose different capital-labor intensities in equilibrium, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, factor price equalization theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, and 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem hold. If industries choose the same capital-labor intensity 
in equilibrium, the volume of trade is zero. None of the four theorems applies. 
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1. Introduction 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) paradigm was originated by Heckscher (1919) and 
elaborated by his student Ohlin (1933), an eminent scholar and politician. A formal 
presentation of the two-factor, two-goods model is provided by Samuelson (1948, 1949) 
and the multiple-factor and multiple-goods version of the model (the HOV model) is 
studied by Vanek (1968). The HO theorem argues that a country will export the product 
that uses its relatively abundant factor more intensively. Starting with Leontief (1953), this 
hypothesis has been subjected to extensive empirical testing. Overall, empirical 
performance of the model is unsatisfactory. Staiger (1988, p. 129) views that the bulk of 
the empirical evidence suggests that factor content of trade as a linear function of national 
and world endowment is not an empirically reliable description of the pattern of 
international trade. Similar opinions have been expressed by Maskus (1985), Bowen et al. 
(1987), and Trefler (1995). In Trefler (1995), it is also found that the volume of trade is 
much lower than the level predicted by the HO theorem.  
The HO paradigm has some charming features. First, the HO model is intuitively 
appealing. For example, Kuwait exports oil mainly because it is well endowed with oil. 
                                                 
1  I thank Constantine Angyridis, Ingrid Bryan, Michael Jolly, Sunwoong Kim, Leo Michelis, Deborah 
Minehart, Amy Peng, Robert Schwab, and Daniel Vincent for their helpful comments. I also thank two 
anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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Hong Kong SAR imports apples because it is not endowed with the type of climate to 
produce apples. Second, the HO paradigm is versatile. In the Ricardian model, since labor 
is the only factor of production, income distribution effects of trade are absent. As stressed 
by Heckscher (1919), the HO framework is built to address the income distribution effects 
of trade. The four main theorems of the HO paradigm: the HO theorem (Heckscher 1919, 
Ohlin 1933), the factor price equalization theorem (Heckscher 1919, Samuelson 1948, 
1949), the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson 1941), and the Rybczynski 
theorem (Rybczynski 1955) address various issues, such as the impact of tariffs on factor 
returns. The HO model is also rich in policy implications. As the HO model is a very 
important vehicle for studies in international trade, the inconsistency between theoretical 
studies and empirical evidence thus poses a theoretically significant and policy relevant 
question: can the HO framework be reformulated to be consistent with empirical evidence? 
One key assumption in the HO model is that countries employ the same production 
technologies. This assumption is controversial as scholars are concerned with the empirical 
validity of this assumption. While Heckscher (1919) is more willing to assume that 
countries have the same technologies, Ohlin (1933) stresses differences in technologies 
among countries as a cause of international trade.2 Samuelson (1948, p. 181, 1949, p. 195) 
is cautious about this assumption even though he makes this assumption explicitly. 3 
Samuelson (1951-1952, p. 121) even views this assumption may have the impact of 
“explaining nothing and possibly obscuring a great deal.” Empirical studies such as Bowen 
et al. (1987), Trefler (1993, 1995), Davis and Weinstein (2001), and Schott (2003) have 
consistently revealed that by allowing differences in countries’ technologies, the 
performance of the HO model is improved. 
One possible way to save the HO model is to drop the assumption of identical 
production technologies. However, scholars may have reservations about using differences 
in technologies together with differences in factor endowments to explain the pattern of 
                                                 
2 Heckscher (1919, p. 280) is aware that a tacitly made assumption in his paper is that “the same technique 
is used to produce a given commodity in different countries”. For Ohlin (1933, p. 101), he writes “many 
important articles are produced in various countries by means of widely different technical processes.” 
3 With the assumption of identical technologies between countries, Heckscher (1919) and Samuelson (1948, 
1949) find that international trade leads to equalization of factor returns. As Ohlin (1933) views that different 
technologies are relevant, his opinion is that trade will lead to partial rather than full equalization of factor 
returns.  
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trade. By assuming that countries have the same production technologies, the HO model 
tries to isolate the impact of different factor endowments on the pattern of international 
trade. Assuming differences in both factor endowments and technologies to explain the 
pattern of international trade deviates from this spirit. 
This paper studies the impact of factor endowment on international trade in a two-sector 
general equilibrium model in which firms choose their production technologies 
endogenously. In this paper, similar to the HO model, the only difference between the two 
countries is their endowments of factors of production. It is assumed that different countries 
have access to the same set of technologies. In each country, given the prices of factors of 
production, firms choose their technologies. These technologies reflect the possibility that 
there is some degree of substitution between capital and labor. A firm’s choice of 
technology is affected by the prices of factors of production, which reflect the endowments 
of factors. 
The optimal choice of technologies leads to two possibilities. In the first case, the two 
sectors have the same capital-labor ratio in equilibrium. None of the four theorems of the 
HO model applies. In this case, though countries differ in their factor endowments, the 
volume of trade of final goods is zero as the price ratio of final goods is the same in both 
countries. Thus, one contribution of this paper is that it provides an explanation to Trefler’s 
(1995) observation of “missing trade.” The intuition behind this case is that different factor 
endowments between countries are totally absorbed by different technologies, rather than 
by different price ratios of final goods. In the second case that the two industries choose 
different factor intensities in equilibrium, it is shown that the four theorems of the HO 
model are valid. Though countries only differ in factor endowment ex ante, countries will 
also differ in their production technologies as countries choose different technologies in 
equilibrium, regardless of whether industries choose the same factor intensity or not. Thus, 
another contribution of this paper is that it shows technology is a channel through which 
endowment differences affect the pattern of trade. With this indirect channel, the factor 
content of trade may not be a linear function of national and world factor endowment. 
Whether the two sectors choose the same factor intensity in equilibrium depends on the 
specification of production technologies of the two sectors. The two sectors are more likely 
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to have the same factor intensity if they have similar degrees of substitution between capital 
and labor. The degree of substitution of an industry can be measured by empirical studies.  
Following Zhou (2004), the key assumption in this paper is that there are many different 
technologies to produce the same product. Casual observation supports the empirical 
validity of this assumption. An example is the technology for the production of agricultural 
goods. In a developing country such as China, labor is used intensively in the production 
of agricultural goods. In a developed country such as Canada, the production of agricultural 
goods relies more on capital inputs, such as harvest machines. Though China and Canada 
have access to the same set of production technologies, they choose different technologies 
in equilibrium. Given China’s large surplus of workers and low wage rate, though harvest 
machines are available in China, they are not adopted as it is more profitable to use labor 
more intensively. Similarly, given the large amount of accumulated capital and high wage 
rates, though agricultural goods in Canada could be produced by mainly employing labor, 
it is more profitable to use capital more intensively. 
In this paper, compared to a country with a lower capital-labor intensity, a country with 
a higher capital-labor intensity substitutes labor by capital in production. The discussion of 
the substitution between capital and labor on international trade goes back at least to 
Heckscher (1919). Arrow et al. (1961) argue that this type of substitution is very important 
in various fields of economics. Minhas (1962) formally explores the implications of this 
type of substitution in international trade. Impact of the choice of technology is also studied 
at Zhou (2007a, b). The innovation of this paper is that it connects the substitution between 
capital and labor to the fundamental endowment of factors. Thus, by employing a simple 
general equilibrium model, a third contribution of this paper is that it introduces a firm’s 
endogenous choice of technology to the study of the impacts of factor endowments on 
international trade. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. This paper allows the production function 
to be either of the constant returns to scale type or the increasing returns to scale type. The 
basic model assumes perfect competition as Sections 2-4 study the case that the production 
functions have constant returns to scale. Section 2 sets up the basic framework. In Section 
3, as industries choose the same factor intensity in equilibrium, the four theorems of the 
HO model do not apply. In Section 4, industries choose different factor intensities in 
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equilibrium. The four theorems of the HO model are shown to be valid. Imperfect 
competition is studied in Section 5 in which the production functions exhibit increasing 
returns to scale. Regardless of whether the production functions exhibit constant or 
increasing returns to scale, it is shown that the relative price of final goods can be 
independent of a country’s endowment of factors of production. As a result, trade generated 
by differences in factor endowments is zero. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Constant Returns to Scale Production Technologies 
In this section, it is assumed that the production functions exhibit constant returns to 
scale. There are two countries: home and foreign. Only the home country is studied as the 
analysis for the foreign country is similar.  
Capital and labor are the two factors of production. There are two goods: clothing ( c ) 
and food ( f ). For fci , , the price of product i  is denoted by ip . Consumers in the two 
countries have the same preferences. The only difference between the two countries is that 
they have different ratios of capital to labor. Let the home country’s endowment of capital 
and labor be K  and L , respectively. Let r  denote the rental price of a unit of capital 
service and w  denote the wage rate.  
It is assumed that countries have access to the same set of production technologies. To 
produce each product, there is a continuum of fixed coefficient technologies. Different 
production technologies correspond to different combinations of capital and labor. For 
fci , , let in  denote the level of technology for a firm producing product i . To produce 
each unit of product i , the quantity of capital needed is )( ii nk  and the quantity of labor 
needed is )( ii nl . Thus, the constant marginal cost of producing product i  is 
)()( iiii nwlnrk  . To capture the idea that capital and labor are substitutable in production, 
it is assumed that when in  increases, )( ii nk  decreases and )( ii nl  increases. That is, 
0'ik  and 0'il . 
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A firm’s profit of producing each unit of product i  is wnlrnkp iiiii )()(  .4 A firm 
takes the price of its product, the wage rate, and the interest rate as given and chooses the 
level of technology optimally to maximize its profit. For a firm producing clothing, the 
first order condition for its optimal choice of technology is 
    0)(')('  wnlrnk cccc .         (1a) 
Similarly, for a firm producing food, the optimal choice of technology leads to 
    0)(')('  wnlrnk ffff .         (1b) 
Equations (1a) and (1b) show that a firm’s choice of technology is affected by the 
relative price of capital to labor. In equilibrium, returns to factors are affected by factor 
endowments. Thus, a firm’s choice of technology is ultimately determined by factor 
endowments. 
From (1a) and (1b), the second order condition for profit maximization requires that 
   0)('')(''  wnlrnk iiii , for fci , . 
It is assumed that 0'' il  and 0'' ik . Also, ''il and ''ik  are not equal to zero at the 
same time. Thus, the second order condition is satisfied. Plugging the values of w  and r  
from equations (1a) and (1b) into the second order condition leads to  
    0''
'
'''  i
i
ii k
l
kl , for fci , .           (2) 
As prices of factors are flexible, in equilibrium all factors will be fully employed. Let 
iX  denote the total industry output of product i . The total demand for labor is 
ffcc lXlX  . The total supply of labor is L . Full employment of labor requires that 
    LlXlX ffcc  .          (3a) 
Full employment of capital requires that 
    KkXkX ffcc  .          (3b) 
Zero profits require that a firms’ cost of production equals the price it receives: 
    ccc pwlrk  .          (4a) 
    fff pwlrk  .          (4b) 
                                                 
4 With constant returns to scale in production, a firm’s output is indeterminate. But this is not essential in this 
paper. 
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It is assumed that consumers have homothetic preferences. With this assumption, 
demand for goods is not affected by the distribution of income. Let   and   denote 
positive constants. Let iq  denote a consumer’s consumption of product i . A consumer’s 
utility function is given by 



   11 )1( fc qq . For this type of utility functions, it is well 
known that a consumer’s utility maximization leads to a fixed percentage of income spent 
on each product. The total income in this economy is rKwL  . As   percent of the income 
is spent on clothing, total demand for clothing is )( rKwL  . The total value of supply of 
clothing is cc Xp . Similarly, 1  percentage of total income is spent on food and the 
supply of food is ff Xp . Goods market equilibrium requires that 
    cc XprKwL  )( ,          (5a) 
    ff XprKwL  ))(1(  .         (5b) 
Equations (1a), (1b), and (3a)-(5b) form a system of eight equations defining eight 
variables cn , fn , cX , fX , cp , fp , w , and r . An equilibrium is a set of variables cn , 
fn , cX , fX , cp , fp , w , and r  satisfying equations (1a), (1b), and (3a)-(5b). 
The price of clothing is normalized to 1: 
    1cp  .              (6) 
With this normalization, the price of food fp  also measures the price ratio of the two 
goods. 
Following Samuelson (1949), it is assumed that there is no factor-intensity reversal. 5 
A sufficient condition for this assumption to be valid is as follows. For fci , , the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in industry i  is defined as 
ii
ii
ii
ii
i kl
lk
ldl
kdk
'
'
/
/  . Let jik  ( jil ) denote industry i ’s capital (labor) input for factor prices 
at level j . Suppose the clothing industry is more capital intensive when the wage rate is 
1w  and the interest rate is 1r  and the clothing industry is less capital intensive when the 
wage rate is 2w  and the interest rate is 2r . That is, 
                                                 
5 Some discussions of this concept include Robinson (1956), Minhas (1962), and Wong (1990). Wong 
provides sufficient conditions to rule out factor intensity reversal in a multi-factor, two-good economy. 
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    1
1
1
1
f
f
c
c
l
k
l
k  ,           (7a) 
    2
2
2
2
f
f
c
c
l
k
l
k  .           (7b) 
As equations (1a) and (1b) hold, inequalities (7a) and (7b) lead to 
    11 fc   ,           (8a) 
    22 fc   .           (8b) 
For constant elasticity of substitution functions, it is impossible for (8a) and (8b) to 
hold at the same time. Thus, for this type of production functions, factor intensity reversal 
will not occur. One example of this type of production function is that iii nnl )( , and 
 /)1()()(  iii nnk , with )1,0( . In this case, 
 1i . 
Equations (1a) and (1b) lead to 
    
'
'
'
'
f
f
c
c
l
k
l
k  .             (9) 
Equation (9) defines an implicit relationship between cn  and fn . Depending on the 
explicit functional forms of ck , cl , fk , and fl , the restriction imposed by equation (9) 
may lead to two cases. In the first case, the two industries have the same capital-labor ratio 
in equilibrium, 
f
f
c
c
l
k
l
k  .            (10) 
An example of this type of technologies is that  
c
c n
k 1 , cc nl  , 
f
f n
k  , and ff nl  .          (11) 
In (11),   is a positive constant. Plugging (11) into (9) leads to cf nn 2/1 . This leads to 
(10).  
In the second case, the two industries have different capital-labor ratios in equilibrium, 
f
f
c
c
l
k
l
k  . An example of this type of technologies is that  
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c
c n
k 1 , 2)( cc nl  , 
f
f
n
k 1 , and ff nl  .        (12) 
From (11) and (12), industries are more likely to choose different factor intensities 
when the degrees of substitution between capital and labor in different industries are very 
different. The degree of substitution of an industry can be measured by empirical studies, 
such as the one conducted in Arrow et al. (1961).  
In the following, the case that industries choose the same factor intensity and the case 
that industries choose different factor intensities are studied sequentially. 
 
3. Industries with the Same Factor Intensity 
This section focuses on the case that the optimal choice of technologies leads the two 
industries to have the same level of capital-labor intensity. For (3a), (3b), and (10) to be 
consistent, it is needed that 
    
c
c
k
l
K
L
k
l
f
f  .           (13) 
The following lemma studies the impact of factor endowments on a firm’s choice of 
technology. 
 
Lemma 1. When industries choose the same factor intensity in equilibrium, an increase 
in the endowment of capital increases the capital-labor ratio in both industries. 
Proof. It is clear from (13) and the assumptions that 0'ik  and 0'il .     QED 
 
From Lemma 1, a country with a higher capital-labor ratio use technologies employing 
capital more intensively in every industry.  
The following lemma studies how the returns to factors are affected by factor 
endowments. 
 
Lemma 2. The wage rate is positively related to the amount of capital and negatively 
related to the amount of labor in a country. The interest rate is negatively related to the 
amount of capital and positively related to the amount of labor in a country. 
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Proof. Equations (1a), (4a), and (6) lead to 
'
'
1
c
c
cc l
klk
r

 . For the denominator of the 
right-hand side of this expression, from (2), it is clear that 
   
c
c
c
cc
dn
l
klkd 




'
'
 0''
'
'''
'



  c
c
cc
c
c k
l
lk
l
l . 
Thus, 0
cdn
dr . Combining this result with Lemma 1, it is clear that 0
dK
dn
dn
dr
dK
dr c
c
. 
Equations (1a), (4a), and (6) can also be employed to yield 
'
'
1
c
c
cc k
lkl
w

 . For the 
denominator of the right-hand side of this expression, from (2), it is clear that 
   
c
c
c
cc
dn
k
lkld 




'
'
 0''
'
'''
'



  c
c
cc
c
c l
k
kl
k
k . 
Thus, 0
cdn
dw . Combining this result with Lemma 1, it is clear that 0
dK
dn
dn
dw
dK
dw c
c
. 
              QED 
From (1a), (1b), and (3a)-(5b), 
c
c l
LX  , and 
f
f l
LX )1(  . As cX  and fX  move 
in the same direction as L  changes, the output of both goods increases when the amount 
of factor endowment increases. 
Manipulation of the system of equations (1a), (1b), and (3a)-(5b) leads to the following 
three equations (14a)-(14c) defining three variables fp , cn , and fn  as functions of 
exogenously given variables: 
   01  fcf llpV ,         (14a) 
   02  cc kK
LlV ,         (14b) 
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   03  ff kK
LlV .6         (14c) 
The validity of the four theorems of the HO model depends on the assumption that 
industries have different factor intensities. In the following, the four theorems of the HO 
model are shown to be invalid as industries choose the same factor intensity in equilibrium. 
First, Proposition 1 shows that the HO theorem does not apply. 
 
Proposition 1. If industries choose the same capital-labor intensity in equilibrium, the 
price ratio of final goods is independent of the endowment ratio. 
Proof. Total differentiation of the system of equations (14a)-(14c) leads to 
   






























f
c
fcf
n
V
n
V
n
V
n
V
p
V
3
2
111
00
00










f
c
f
dn
dn
dp
dK
K
V
K
V




















3
2
0
.        (15) 
For A  as the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (15), it can be shown that 
   0'''' 



 



  ffcccA kK
Llk
K
Lll . 
Define 
fccf n
V
K
V
n
V
K
V
n
V
n
V











 3213211 . 
From (14a)-(14c), it can be shown that 
   



  '''21 ffccf kK
Lllkp
K
L




  '''2 ccff kK
Lllk
K
L  
   








c
f
f
f
fcfc
l
l
p
l
k
K
L
K
Lkll
'
'
1
''
2 . 
                                                 
6 Equation (14a) comes from (4a), (4b), (6), and (10a). Equations (14b) and (14c) come from (13). 
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From (14a), 01  . Application of Cramer’s rule on the system (15) leads to 
01 


A
f
dK
dp
.             QED 
 
From Proposition 1, though countries have different ratios of factor endowments, they 
have the same price ratio of final goods. Difference in endowments is totally absorbed by 
the choice of different technologies. Countries will not trade final goods as the price ratio 
of final goods is the same in both countries. In this case, the volume of trade generated by 
differences in factor endowments is zero. This provides an explanation to Trefler’s 
observation (1995) that the volume of trade is much lower than the level predicted by the 
HO model. 
Proposition 1 is a formal presentation of Heckscher’s claim (1919, p. 278) that “a 
(further) indispensable condition is that the proportions in which the factors of production 
are combined should not be the same for one commodity as for another. In the absence of 
this (second) condition, the price of one commodity, compared with the price of another 
would remain the same in all countries regardless of differences in relative factor prices.” 
Second, it is clear that the factor price equalization theorem does not hold in this case. 
The reason is that there is no trade of final goods to equalize different factor returns 
between countries. 
Third, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not apply if the two sectors choose the 
same factor intensity. Stolper and Samuelson (1941) argue that the impact of international 
trade comes from a change in the price ratio of final goods. By treating the prices of final 
goods as exogenous parameters and conducting comparative static analysis, the impact of 
international trade on factor returns can be studied. The invalidity of the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem is clear from the system of equations (1a), (1b), and (3a)-(4b). From (1a), (1b), 
and (4b), 
'
'
f
f
ff
f
l
k
lk
p
r

 , and 
'
'
f
f
ff
f
k
l
kl
p
w

 . As fk  and fl  are determined by (13) and 
not affected by fp , it is clear that r  and w  move in the same direction as fp  changes. 
Fourth and finally, the Rybczynski theorem does not apply. This theorem shows that if 
the prices of final goods are exogenous, the output of the capital-intensive goods increases 
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and the output of the labor-intensive goods decreases when the endowment of capital 
increases. If prices of final goods are exogenous and industries choose the same factor 
intensity, the output of the two final goods is undetermined. 
 
4. Industries with Different Factor Intensities 
This section focuses on the case that the optimal choice of technologies leads the two 
industries to have different capital-labor intensities in equilibrium. 
Manipulation of equations (3a) and (3b) leads to the following expression of the output 
of the two sectors: 
   
fcfc
ff
c lkkl
KlLk
X


 ,         (16a) 
   
fcfc
cc
f lkkl
LkKlX

 .         (16b) 
Manipulation of equations (4a) and (4b) leads to the following expression of the returns 
to factors: 
   
fcfc
cffc
lkkl
kpkp
w


 ,         (17a) 
   
fcfc
fccf
lkkl
lplp
r


 .         (17b) 
Equations (1a), (1b), and (3a)-(5b) can be simplified into the following system of three 
equations: 
  0''''1  cffc lklkH ,         (18a) 
  0))(1()(2  ffccf KlLkLkKlpH  ,      (18b) 
  0)(')('3  cffccfccfc kpkpllplpkH .7      (18c) 
From (18c), it can be shown that 03 


fn
H . Total differentiation of the system of 
equations (18a)-(18c) with respect to fp , cn , fn , and K  leads to 
                                                 
7 Equation (18a) comes from equations (1a) and (1b). Equation (18b) comes from equations (5a), (5b), (16a), and (16b). 
Equation (18c) comes from equations (1a), (1b), (17a), and (17b). 
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
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
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2 .       (19) 
Let B  denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (19). For stability, B  is 
assumed to be negative. The following proposition shows that a firm’s technology is 
determined by factor endowments. 
 
Proposition 2. When industries choose different capital-labor intensities in 
equilibrium, an increase in the endowment of capital increases the capital-labor ratio in 
both industries. 
Proof. Application of Cramer’s rule on the system (19) leads to 
   B
ff
c
p
H
K
H
n
H
dK
dn 





 321 , 
   B
fc
f
p
H
K
H
n
H
dK
dn






 321 . 
Partial differentiation of equations (18a)-(18c) yields 
0''''''1 


cffc
c
lklk
n
H ,          (20) 
   
fn
H

 1 0''
'
'''
' 


  f
c
cf
c kl
kl
l ,          (21) 
   
K
H

 2 0)1(  fcf llp  ,          (22) 
0''3 


cccc
f
lkkl
p
H .           (23) 
From (20)-(23), it is clear that 0
dK
dnc , and 0
dK
dn f .       QED 
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Proposition 2 shows that countries will have different input coefficients if they have 
different ratios of factor endowments. Lemma 1 and  Proposition 2 together show that 
countries also differ in technologies if their factor endowment are different, no matter 
whether in equilibrium industries choose the same factor intensity or not. This result is 
consistent with the empirical research of Bowen et al. (1987) as they find that factor input 
matrices between different countries are different. 
In the following, the four theorems of the HO model are shown to be valid. First, 
Proposition 3 is a modified version of the HO theorem with technologies chosen 
endogenously. It shows that 0/ dKdp f  if and only if ccff lklk //  .  
 
Proposition 3 (HO Theorem). When the two industries have different factor 
intensities, an increase in the endowment of capital decreases the price ratio of the product 
using capital more intensively. 
Proof. Partial differentiation of equation (18c) yields 
cn
H

 3 ))(''''( fcfccc lkklwlrk  .          (24) 
For 
cf n
H
K
H
n
H





 3212 , from (21), (22), and (24), it can be shown that 
  


  ''
'
'''
'2 f
c
cf
c kl
kl
l ))('''')()1(( fcfcccfcf lkklwlrkllp   . 
The sign of 2  is the same as the sign of fcfc lkkl  . If 0 fcfc lkkl , or 
c
c
f
f
l
k
l
k
 , the 
clothing industry is less capital intensive and 02  . Thus, 02 

B
f
dK
dp
. Similarly, if 
c
c
f
f
l
k
l
k
 , 0
dK
dp f .            QED 
 
In this case that industries have different factor intensities, with the opening of 
international trade, the country with a higher capital-labor ratio will export the product 
using capital more intensively. 
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Second, Proposition 4 shows that the factor price equalization theorem holds. 
 
Proposition 4 (Factor Price Equalization Theorem). If industries choose different 
factor intensities in equilibrium, international trade leads to the equalization of the wage 
rate and the interest rate. 
Proof. Equations (18a) and (18c) define the level of technologies as functions of prices 
of final goods. As trade leads to the equalization of prices of final goods, countries will 
adopt the same technologies. From (1a) and (1b), same technologies lead to the same wage 
rate and the same interest rate.          QED 
 
From the proof of Proposition 4, trade not only leads to a convergence of factor returns, 
but also to a convergence of technologies used in different countries. The proof of 
Proposition 4 depends on the assumption that trade will lead to the same prices of final 
goods all over the world. Due to transportation costs and other trade impediments, 
equalization of prices of final goods may not occur in reality. 
For the rest of this section, the prices of final goods are treated as exogenous 
parameters. For exogenously given prices, equations (1a), (1b), (3a), (3b), (4a), and (4b) 
define a set of six variables.  
Third, Proposition 5 shows that the result in Stolper and Samuelson (1941) is valid for 
endogenous technologies. 
 
Proposition 5 (Stolper-Samuelson Theorem). Suppose food is the capital-intensive 
product. If the price of food increases, the interest rate increases and the wage rate 
decreases. 
Proof. Manipulation of equation (17b) yields 
  0)()(4  cffccffc lplprlklkH .         (25) 
Equations 1H , 3H , and 4H  can be differentiated to get 
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.       (26) 
For the coefficient of the determinant matrix of (26), 
r
H
n
H
n
H
cf
C 




 431 . Partial 
differentiation of equation (25) yields 04 


cn
H , 04 


fn
H , and c
f
l
p
H 

 4 . Application of 
Cramer’s rule on the system (26) leads to 
   
rH
pH
dp
dr f
f 


/
/
4
4
cffc
c
lklk
l

 . 
Thus, 0
fdp
dr  if and only if 0 cffc lklk , or 
f
f
c
c
l
k
l
k  . Similarly, 0
fdp
dw  if and only 
if 
f
f
c
c
l
k
l
k  .             QED 
 
From (26), it can be shown that 
   
))(''''(
''
/
/
3
3
fcfccc
cccc
c
f
f
c
lkklwlrk
kllk
nH
pH
dp
dn




 .       (27) 
Since 0''  cccc kllk  and 0''''  cc wlrk , from (27), 0/ fc dpdn  if and only if 
0 fcfc lkkl . Similarly, 0/ ff dpdn  if and only if 0 fcfc lkkl . Thus, if food is the 
capital-intensive product, when the price of food increases, the capital-labor intensity for 
the food sector increases and the intensity of the clothing sector decreases. 
Fourth and finally, Proposition 6 shows that the Rybczynski theorem is valid for 
endogenous technologies. 
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Proposition 6 (Rybczynski Theorem). An increase in the amount of capital increases 
the output of clothing and decreases the output of food if the clothing industry is more 
capital-intensive. 
Proof. Manipulation of equation (16a) yields 
0)()(5  ffccffc LkKlXlklkH . 
Differentiation of 1H , 3H , and 5H  leads to 
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For the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (28), D
ccf X
H
n
H
n
H





 531 . For 3
K
H
n
H
n
H
cf 




 531 , application of Cramer’s rule on the system (28) leads to 
D
c
dK
dX

 3
cffc
f
lklk
l

 . 
Thus, 0/ dKdX c  if and only if 0 cffc lklk . Similarly, 0/ dKdX f  if and only if 
0 cffc lklk .             QED 
 
5. Increasing Returns to Scale Production Technologies 
In this section, the production functions exhibit increasing returns to scale arising from 
fixed costs of production. For Ohlin (1933), increasing returns to scale is a very important 
source for countries to engage in international trade. When there are two products, if 
countries specialize in producing one product and trade, some fixed cost of production can 
be saved. This benefit is absent here as it is assumed that both countries produce both 
products. The main purpose of this section is to show that under increasing returns to scale, 
differences in factor endowments may not lead to differences in the price ratio of final 
goods. 
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With the existence of fixed costs of production, the number of firms producing each 
product is small.8 In this case, a firm may have market power in the factor market. To avoid 
this, instead of two goods, it is assumed that there are two groups of goods. In each group, 
there is a continuum of goods. The utility function is modified correspondingly to 
1
)1(
1
1
0
111
0
))())(



















 dvvqdq mc .        (29) 
It is assumed that all goods in the same group are symmetric in terms of costs of 
production. As there is a continuum of goods, though a firm may have market power in the 
output market, it does not have market power in the factor market. With this assumption, 
each group of goods can be viewed as one product. To produce a product, both fixed and 
marginal costs are needed. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that only capital is used 
in the fixed cost of production and only labor is used for the marginal cost of production.9  
For fci , , a firm’s fixed cost is )( ii n  units of capital and its marginal cost is )( ii n  
units of labor. When in  increases, )( ii n  decreases and )( ii n  increases. This 
assumption captures the idea that there is some degree of substitution between capital and 
labor in production. If a technology uses a lot of machines, the fixed cost of capital is high. 
However, the marginal cost of labor is low.10 
Let ix  denote the quantity of production for a firm producing product i . Since a firm’s 
total revenue is ii xp  and its total cost is wxnrn iii )()(   , its profit is wxrxp iiiii  
. A firm chooses the level of technology optimally to maximize its profit. Taking first order 
condition with respect to in  yields 
   0''  wxr iii  , for fci , .11         (30) 
                                                 
8 When firms have market power in the product market, the opening of trade may be beneficial since it 
increases the degree of competition (Brander, 1981). 
9 This assumption is more appropriate compared to the assumption that capital is only related to marginal 
cost of production and labor is only related to the fixed cost of production. Capital is embodied in equipments. 
In their empirical research, De Long and Summers (1991) show that each extra percent of GDP invested in 
equipment leads to an increase in GDP growth of one third of a percentage point per year over the period1960-
1985. Equipments may be more appropriately modeled as a fixed cost rather than a marginal cost of 
production. 
10 Zhou (2004) has a detailed discussion of the motivation of this type of assumptions. 
11 It is assumed that the second order condition 0''''  wxr iii   is satisfied. For the cost function 
specified in (42), it can be checked that this assumption is valid. 
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A firm also chooses the quantity of production optimally. It is assumed that firms 
producing the same product engage in Cournot competition. Taking first order condition 
with respect to ix  yields 0
 w
x
pxp i
i
i
ii  . Let im  denote the number of firms 
producing product i . For the utility function (29), a consumer’s utility maximization leads 
to the result that the elasticity of demand faced by a firm is im .12 Plugging this elasticity 
into the first order condition with respect to output leads to 
   w
m
p i
i
i 



  11 , for fci , .         (31) 
In equilibrium, a firm makes a profit of zero. This requirement leads to 
0 wxrxp iiiii  , for fci , .         (32) 
Each firm producing clothing demands cc x  units of labor and the total demand for 
labor from the clothing industry is ccc xm  . Similarly, the total demand for labor from the 
food industry is fff xm  . The total supply for labor in the economy is L . Clearance of 
labor market requires that 
   Lxmxm fffccc   .          (33) 
The demand for capital from the clothing sector is ccm  . The demand for capital from 
the food sector is ffm  . The total supply of capital is K . Clearance of capital market 
requires that 
   Kmm ffcc   .           (34) 
The total demand for clothing is )( rKwL   and the total demand for food is 
))(1( rKwL  . The total supply of product i  is iii xmp . Goods market equilibrium 
requires that 
   ccc xmprKwL  )( ,        (35a) 
   fff xmprKwL  ))(1(  .        (35b) 
                                                 
12 See Zhou (2006) for a detailed derivation of this type of formula. 
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Equations (30) and (31)-(35b) are a system of ten equations defining ten variables cn , 
fn , cx , fx , cp , fp , cm , fm , w , and r . The following proposition shows that a 
difference in factor endowments may not lead to a difference in the price ratio of final 
goods. 
 
Proposition 7. For the increasing returns to scale production technologies, the price 
ratio of the final goods is independent of the endowment ratio. 
Proof. For symmetry in this section, let the interest rate rather than the price of clothing 
be normalized to unity. That is, 1r . For fci , , from (31), it can be shown that 
    
)( wp
pm
ii
i
i  
 .          (36) 
Equation (32) yields 
wp
x
ii
i
i 


 .           (37) 
By plugging equation (37) into (30), it can be shown that 
    wp
i
iiii
i '
)''(

  .         (38) 
Plugging (37) and (38) into (34) yields 
   0
'
''
'
'' 

 K
f
ffff
c
cccc



 .        (39) 
Dividing (35a) by (35b) and plugging in (36)-(38) leads to 
   
c
f
cffff
fcccc






2
')''(
')''(
1 









.         (40) 
Equations (39) and (40) define cn  and fn  as functions of exogenous variables. As L  
does not appear in any of the equations, a firm’s choice of technology is not affected by L
. Thus, it is not affected by the factor endowment ratio. 
From (40), the price ratio of final goods is given by 
   
c
f
ffff
cccc
f
c
p
p



 '
)''(
)''(

 .          (41) 
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From (41), the price ratio is determined by the level of technologies only. Thus, the price 
ratio is not affected by the endowment ratio.         QED 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 7 can be obtained by inspection of the system of 
equations (39) and (40). Labor endowment does not enter equation (39) (which is a 
transformation of equation (33)) since the number of firms in each industry is determined 
by this industry’s technology only. Labor endowment also does not enter equation (40) 
(which is a result of dividing (35a) by (35b)). From the right-hand side of (35a) and (35b), 
labor endowment may affect the price ratio either through its impact on the wage rate or 
through the number of firms in an industry. Though labor endowment affects the wage rate, 
with a homothetic utility function, the impact of wage rate on price ratio that works from 
the demand side cancels out as a result of dividing (35a) by (35b). From the supply side, 
the wage rate affects the output as each industry’s output is inversely related to the wage 
rate (through (30)). However, as a result of dividing (35a) by (35b), impact of labor 
endowment through the wage rate and thus output also cancels out. As a result, labor 
endowment does not affect the price ratio of final goods. 
One example of this independence of price ratio of final goods on factor endowment is 
as follows. For   and   denoting positive constants, the technologies are specified as  
 2/1)( cc n  , 2/1)(  cc n , 2/1)( ff n  , and 2/1)(  ff n .           (42) 
Plugging (42) into the system of equations (30) and (31)-(35b) leads to 
)1/(/  cf pp . As the price ratio is not affected by endowments of factors of 
production, countries may not trade final goods as the price ratio of final goods is the same 
in both countries. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of factor endowments on international trade in a two-
sector model in which firms choose their production technologies endogenously. Though 
countries differ only in their factor endowments ex ante, they may also differ in their chosen 
technologies ex post. If industries choose different capital-labor intensities in equilibrium, 
the HO theorem, the factor price equalization theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
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and the Rybczynski theorem hold. If industries choose the same capital-labor intensity in 
equilibrium, the volume of trade of final goods is zero. None of the four theorems is valid 
in this case.  
This paper has employed some special functional forms to demonstrate the results. The 
essence of this paper that countries’ differences in factor endowments can be embodied not 
only through different ratios of prices of final goods but also through different technologies 
should be robust in a general background. 
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